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Abstract Big banks pose substantial costs to society in the form of increased systemic risk and
government bailouts during crises. Should regulations limit the size of banks? To answer this question,
regulators need to assess the potential costs of such regulations. If big banks enjoy substantial scale
economies, that is, lower average costs as bank size increases, size limit regulations may be inefficient
and may reduce social welfare. However, the literature offers conflicting results regarding the existence
of economies of scale for the biggest U.S. banks. We contribute to this literature using a novel approach
to estimate nonparametric measures of scale economies and total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
For U.S. commercial banks, we find that around 73% of the top one hundred banks, 98% of medium
and small banks, and seven of the top ten biggest banks by asset size exhibit substantial economies
of scale. In addition, scale economies contribute positively and significantly to their TFP growth.
The existence of substantial scale economies at commercial banks raises an important challenge for
regulators to pursue size limit regulations.
Keywords bank regulation · economies of scale · returns to scale · nonparametric methods
JEL Classification L51 · G21 · G28 · D24 · L25 · C14
1 Introduction
After the latest U.S. financial crisis, the optimal size of banks became an important issue for regula-
tors and policymakers. Too-big-to-fail banks seems to enjoy a funding advantage in capital markets
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over smaller banks mostly due to implicit government guarantees (Gandhi and Lustig, Forthcoming).
Prominent academicians and policy makers have proposed to break up the biggest banks arguing that
they pose substantial costs to society in the form of government bailouts and increased systemic risk.1
However, policy proposals to break up or to cap the size of the biggest U.S. banks failed to materialize.
A possible explanation for this outcome is that there is no consensus on the desirability or feasibility of
capping the size of banks (Stern and Feldman 2009). More recently, the discussion has been reignited
and capping the size of banks is again at the center of the regulatory policy debate.
Against this backdrop, the existence of economies of scale for the biggest U.S. banks has become
a contentious and important issue. Economies of scale, that is, the existence of lower average costs
as firm’s size increases, have been at the center of policy analyses in the regulation and deregulation
of different industries.2 It could be challenging for regulators to promote perfect competition when
substantial economies of scale are present (Laudati, 1981). As suggested by Borts (1954), the existence
of scale economies may lead regulators to favor the emergence and consolidation of large firms while
ensuring that customers are served on reasonable terms—even if new entry and competition in the
market is reduced.
Since Williamson (1968, 1977) economies of scale underlie almost every aspect of antitrust regula-
tion and constitute the basis for the well-known efficiency defense in mergers.3 For instance, a merger
that lowers competition may bypass antitrust restrictions if the merging parties can demonstrate that
the merger is necessary to achieve substantial efficiencies that will enhance consumers’ welfare. DeY-
oung (1991) shows that the Williamsonian efficiency defense was implemented by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors in deciding over bank mergers even though the U.S. Supreme Court had not
recognized offsetting efficiencies as a defense of an anticompetitive merger.4
Conventional wisdom says that as firms get bigger economies of scale tend to shrink towards zero–
ultimately reaching to a point where the efficient scale size is achieved. Thus, regulating their size
could be unnecessary. However, if banks enjoy scale economies, regulators and policymakers have to
balance the benefits with the costs of further bank growth. Lower average costs may allow banks to
offer more competitive prices on their services, benefiting consumers and society as a whole. On the
other hand, large scale banks may increase systemic risk and crisis costs. Thus, determining if scale
economies exist for banks have important implications for bank regulation (Feldman, 2010).
The literature on the existence of scale economies for U.S. banks is inconclusive. Early studies
find scale economies for small banks only. According to Berger and Humphrey (1994), the conclusion
that scale economies were available only to smaller U.S. banks was unshaken at the time. In contrast,
more recent studies find scale economies even for the biggest financial institutions (e.g. Wheelock and
Wilson 2012; Hughes and Mester 2013; Malikov, Restrepo-Tobo´n, and Kumbhakar 2014). However,
other studies find no evidence consistent with either scale economies or increasing returns to scale
(RTS) for large U.S. commercial banks (e.g. Feng and Zhang, 2012; Restrepo-Tobo´n and Kumbhakar,
2014; Davies and Tracey, 2014). Thus, the existence of scale economies for the biggest U.S. commercial
banks is still a matter of debate.
We contribute to this literature by measuring scale economies using a novel nonparametric ap-
proach that avoids making restrictive assumptions regarding the functional form of the underlying
1 See Johnson (2012) and the references therein.
2 See for instance Davies and Tracey (2014), Glass and Stefanova (2012), Camacho and Menezes (2009), Nauges
and Van Den Berg (2008), Kumbhakar and Wang (2007), Evans and Guthrie (2006), Fraquelli, Piacenza, and Vannoni
(2005), Foreman and Beauvais (1999), Ellig and Giberson (1993), and Evanoff, Israilevich, and Merris (1990).
3 See Williamson 1968, Berger and Humphrey 1992, Farrell and Shapiro 2001, Schmalensee 2004, McAfee, Mialon,
and Williams 2004, Lagerlof and Heidhues 2005.
4 See Kolasky and Dick (2003) and Kinne (1998) for extensive analyses of how the efficiency defense evolved in
the U.S. Merger Guidelines and Laws and some merger examples in which scale economies considerations were taken
into account.
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technology for banks (see Wheelock and Wilson 2011, 2012). Our approach offers two important ad-
vantages over the nonparametric methods used in previous studies. First, it gives fully nonparametric
estimates of scale economies and total factor productivity (TFP) growth and its components. Previous
nonparametric studies did not examine the relation between scale economies and TFP growth and
did not allow estimation of other important features of the underlying technology like output-cost
elasticities, technical change (TC), input price-cost elasticities, etc., making it difficult to check the
consistency of their results with economic theory. Second, unlike previous studies, our method allows
us to partially control for unobserved heterogeneity across banks.5 Our empirical findings indicate
that failing to control for unobserved heterogeneity may conceal evidence of scale economies.
Overall, our findings suggest that most U.S. commercial banks with assets in excess of $1 billion
enjoy substantial economies of scale (Obelix is not obese).6 However, 35% of the observations for the
top one hundred banks show no evidence of scale economies.7 For the top ten banks with assets ranging
from $47 billion to $1.5 trillion, only 70% of the observations are consistent with economies of scale.8
In particular, of the four banks with assets above $500 billion, on average, only one bank exhibits
economies of scale during the sampling period (only 3 obese Obelix). Thus, capping the size of the
biggest banks (converting them to Asterix) may yield limited social losses from the scale economies
viewpoint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature. In Section 3,
we describe our model, the estimation strategy, and our data. In Section 4, we present our empirical
results and compare them with those in the existing literature. Policy implications of our study are
discussed in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
During the early stages of deregulation of the U.S. banking industry, regulators and policymakers
were concerned that a handful of big diversified banks could emerge and dominate the industry. Banks
appeared to be able to profit from being bigger, threatening the viability of smaller specialized banks
5 We model the unobserved heterogeneity across banks as an additive fixed-effect term. This is the standard
approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity in parametric models (see Chamberlain 1984, Arellano and Honore
2001, and Bai 2009). Ignoring additive unobserved heterogeneity might lead to bias and inconsistency (see Mester
1997, Greene 2005a, Greene 2005b, Kumbhakar, Lien, Flaten, and Tveters 2008, and Wang and Ho 2010). However,
input prices and outputs can vary systematically as a function of input characteristics and bank business models,
which may vary across banks. So input prices and outputs can have different meanings across different banks, and
not all of this variation will necessarily be captured in the bank fixed effects. Further, unobserved heterogeneity can
also be due to differences in costly risk-taking across banks. Note that in addition to controlling for additive fixed
bank-specific effects, in our preferred model, we allow the “core” technology to be nonparametric which allows full
flexibility regarding the marginal effects of input prices and outputs. Since these effects are both bank and year-
specific, differences in input prices and outputs among banks are fully captured by the nonparametric specification
of the technology. In addition, we control for output quality (through nonperfoming loans), risk (via equity), and
nontraditional activities (via noninterest income) to capture heterogeneity across banks that may be confounded with
differing relative costs (e.g. Mester 1996, Rogers 1998) or masquerade sources of risk (e.g. Hughes and Mester 1998).
6 Following the literature, we classify big banks as those with assets above $1 billion dollars; medium banks as
those with assets greater than $100 million and lower than $1 billion dollars; and small banks as those with assets
below $100 million dollars. For each year, we also rank banks by assets and select the top 100 biggest banks. As of
December 31, 2010; there were 479 big banks; 3,637 medium banks; and 2,290 small banks operating in the U.S. By
comparison, as of December 31, 2000, there were 285 big banks; 2,397 medium banks; and 5,452 small banks. All
nominal variables are in 2005 dollars.
7 The banks belonging to the top one hundred banks have assets ranging from $23 to $1.5 trillion.
8 The top ten biggest banks for each year are: State Street Bank and Trust Company, CitiBank, US Bank, Wachovia,
HSBC, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Fleet National Bank, Suntrust Bank, Keybank,
PNC Bank, Regions Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and Citizens Bank.
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(Clark 1988). More recently, empirical evidence shows that advances in technology and changes in
regulation favor large depository institutions (Wheelock and Wilson 2011). Economists think that
economies of scale may explain such phenomena. However, the empirical evidence seems, at best,
inconclusive.
Before 1970, empirical studies showed evidence of scale economies among commercial banks of all
sizes (see Shaffer 1994 and the references therein). During the 1970’s and 1980’s the bulk of empirical
evidence, in contrast, showed scale economies for only small depository institutions.9 In the 1990’s,
the evidence was mixed: some studies find evidence of scale economies for small banks only10 while
others present evidence of scale economies even for the largest banks.11 More recent studies show
evidence of scale economies across the entire bank size distribution. These studies include Wheelock
and Wilson (2011, 2012), Hughes and Mester (2013), and Feng and Serletis (2010). However, Feng
and Zhang (2012) find no evidence consistent with economies of scale for large U.S. commercial banks;
Restrepo-Tobo´n and Kumbhakar (2014) find no evidence of significant economies of scale for large U.S.
banks and bank holding companies; and Davies and Tracey (2014), after controlling for Too-big-to-fail
factors, find no evidence of scale economies for a sample of large U.S. banks.
Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2012) investigate scale economies of U.S. credit unions, commercial
banks, and bank holding companies. Despite the continuous growth of these institutions since the
1980’s, they uncovered substantial economies of scale even for the largest institutions. Using yearly
data from 1989-2006, Wheelock and Wilson (2011) find evidence consistent with economies of scale for
all U.S. credit unions and conclude that further consolidation of the industry and increasing average
size are likely. Regarding commercial banks and bank holding companies, Wheelock and Wilson (2012)
find similar results. Using quarterly data from 1984-2006, their estimates support the existence of
economies of scale for 99.7% of the observations. These results contrast with their earlier work, viz.,
Wheelock and Wilson (2001), which shows that economies of scale were exhausted when banks have
assets between $300 and $500 million. They attribute their contrasting results to the use of a larger
sample and a more realistic model of bank costs in their latest work in which equity capital and
off-balance sheet activities are explicitly incorporated.
Hughes and Mester (2013) present evidence of economies of scale for large U.S. bank holding com-
panies. They use parametric methods to estimate a model accounting for managerial risk preferences
and the endogenous risk taking behavior of banks. Large banks may have lower marginal costs in risk
management due to diversification. This, in turn, may lead banks to take on more risk until all the
scale-related cost savings are exhausted. Thus, failing to account for managerial preferences for risk
and endogenous risk taking leads to bias measures of economies of scale.12
Hughes and Mester (2013) use four different model specifications. The first model omits equity
capital as a conditioning variable and also omits the cost of equity in the cost function. Using this
model, they find little economies of scale for all bank holding companies in the sample. Using a
second model, in which equity capital enters as a conditioning variable, they find diseconomies of
scale for all bank holding companies. Results from a third model incorporating the shadow cost
of equity shows evidence of slight economies of scale for all bank holding companies. However, the
estimates of economies of scale are statistically indistinguishable from those of the first model. Finally,
using a fourth model incorporating managerial preferences and conditioning on the optimal level of
equity capital, they find substantial scale economies for all bank holding companies. In this case,
estimates of economies of scale range from 1.13 for the smallest bank holding companies to 1.37 for
9 See Clark (1988), Berger, Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987), and Shaffer (1994).
10 See Berger and Humphrey (1994), Berger et al (1987), Hunter and Timme (1991), Mester (1994), Clark (1996),
Hughes and Mester (1998), and Wheelock and Wilson (2001).
11 See Shaffer (1994), Hughes, Lang, Mester, and Moon (1996, 2000), Berger and Mester (1997), Hughes and Mester
(1998), Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), and Hughes, Mester, and Moon (2001).
12 See also Hughes et al (1996), Hughes and Mester (1998), Hughes et al (2001), and Hughes and Mester (2010).
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the largest. Contrary to standard economic theory, however, their economies of scale estimates increase
monotonically with bank holding companies’ size. This result is puzzling since most empirical evidence,
including Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2012), show that economies of scale estimates decrease as bank
size increases.
Feng and Serletis (2010) find evidence of increasing returns to scale (RTS) for large banks. Unlike
Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2012) and Hughes and Mester (2013) who use a cost function, Feng
and Serletis use a fully parametric output distance function which does not require data on input
prices. They use data for U.S. banks with assets in excess of $1 billion from 2001 to 2005. The main
contribution of their paper is methodological in nature. They impose monotonicity and curvature
constraints on the underlying bank production technology using Bayesian techniques. They claim
that without such constraints, estimates of RTS and TFP growth are distorted. They obtain RTS
estimates ranging from 1.037 to 1.056, indicating moderate increasing RTS for all banks in the sample.
Nonetheless, from their paper, it is not clear if these results are entirely driven by their method, since
they omit a comparison with the alleged misspecified model. Furthermore, in almost all banking
studies, outputs are treated as exogenous and inputs as endogenous. If this is the case, one should use
an input distance function in which outputs and input ratios appearing as regressors are exogenous
(Das and Kumbhakar 2012). The use of output distance function suffers from endogeneity problem
when inputs are endogenous.
Malikov et al (2014) estimate banks’ production technology based on the ex-ante cost function.
They model credit uncertainty explicitly by recognizing that bank managers minimize costs subject to
given expected outputs and credit risk. They find that virtually all U.S. commercial banks (regardless
of the size) operate with economies of scale. They also show that failing to control for unobserved
heterogeneity across banks may conceal evidence of economies of scale and that methods estimating
the ex-post realization of banking technology lead to downward biases in economies of scale estimates.
Taken together, these studies provide evidence of economies of scale for most banks. However, in
a recent paper, Feng and Zhang (2012) failed to reject constant or decreasing RTS for large and small
banks. They use an output distance function to model banks’ technology and Bayesian techniques for
estimation. Further, they impose monotonicity and curvature conditions to the underlying technology.
They include continuously operating large banks (assets above $1 billion), large community banks
(assets below $1 billion and above $100 million), and small community banks (assets below $100
million) from 1997 to 2006. The main distinction with Feng and Serletis is that Feng and Zhang
explicitly account for technical inefficiency and random unobserved heterogeneity across banks in their
estimation. Their results suggest that failing to do so leads to higher RTS estimates. In particular,
without accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, large banks exhibit increasing RTS ranging from
1.022 in 1997 to 1.01 in 2006. However, when unobserved heterogeneity is incorporated these results
disappear: all large banks now exhibit constant RTS.
More recently, Restrepo-Tobo´n and Kumbhakar (2014) find no evidence of significant increasing
RTS for large U.S. banks and bank holding companies. They use a nonparametric approach based on
input distance functions which need no information on input prices, partially controlling for Too-big-
to-fail cost advantages embedded in input prices. Their results show that although some big banks are
operating under increasing RTS, RTS are close to unity. Davies and Tracey (2014), using a parametric
approach and explicitly controlling for too-big-to-fail factors, also find no evidence of scale economies
for a sample of large U.S. banks. Therefore, the literature is still inconclusive regarding the existence
of economies of scale for the biggest banking organizations in the U.S.
One important criticism that may be leveled against Feng and Zhang’s results is that they do
not include any proxies for risk taking behavior as it is done in Hughes and Mester (2013) and
Wheelock and Wilson (2011, 2012) . Nonetheless, the fact that these latter studies do not account
for unobserved heterogeneity across banks also raise questions about their reliability in line with
Feng and Zhang’s claims. Thus, the literature will benefit from a further investigation on these issues
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using a methodology that may combine the insights of these three lines of research: i) controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity across banks, ii) conditioning on bank risk taking behavior, and iii) using
flexible functional specifications for the underlying technology.13 Our paper goes one step forward in
this direction.14
Another way to rationalize the observed increasing size of banks is to look at the distribution
of TFP components across different bank size categories. If TFP growth differs across the bank size
distribution, some banks will have incentives to increase their scale of operations, even though, by itself,
this strategy may have negligible or negative impact on their performance. For instance, Hunter and
Timme (1986, 1991) investigate how technical change interacts with bank size and scale economies.
Using data for U.S. bank holding companies from1972 to 1982, they find that technical change is
associated with increase in scale economies: technological change lowers cost by 1% per year, increases
the cost-minimizing scale of operations,and affects banks’ product mix.
Early studies indicate that TFP growth in the U.S. banking during the 1980’s was modest or
slightly negative (Humphrey 1991, 1992, 1993, Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey 1993, Wheelock and
Wilson 1999, Stiroh 2000, Semenick Alam 2001, Berger and Mester 2003, Daniels and Tirtiroglu 1998).
Tirtiroglu, Daniels, and Tirtirogu (2005) investigate how the regulatory structure of the time might
have contributed to this phenomenon. They find that deregulation had a positive impact on banks’
long-run productivity growth, confirming the belief that the poor productivity growth was due to
regulatory restrictions. More recently, however, Mukherjee, Ray, and Miller (2001) and Semenick Alam
(2001) find positive productivity growth for large U.S. banks over roughly the same period, indicating
that larger banks may have taken better advantage of technological progress and deregulation.
During the period 1997-2006, Feng and Zhang (2012) find positive productivity growth for large
banks, 2.04% per year on average, but poor productivity growth for small banks, 0.3% per year on
average. They also show that most productivity growth gains are due to technical change and not to
efficiency gains.15 These results echo those of Feng and Serletis (2010) who show that technical change
contributed to 70% of total productivity growth and scale economies account for only 7%.16
3 Methodology
We avoid the problem of specifying a priori any functional form for the underlying cost function.
Unlike previous studies, our method exploits the dynamics between total cost and its determinants
over time. We start from a purely nonparametric specification of the cost function for banks and then
derive a growth equation for costs whose coefficients are nonparametric functions of the arguments
of the cost function, viz., outputs, input prices, and other environmental/control variables. Similarly
to Kumbhakar and Sun (2012), we use the semiparametric smooth coefficient (SPSC) model of Li,
Huang, Li, and Fu (2002) and Li and Racine (2010) to estimate the functional coefficients. The SPSC
model arises naturally from the cost function framework and is not imposed a priori. Moreover, the
functional coefficients of the SPSC model are nonparametric functions of the covariates of the cost
function and are related to TFP growth and its components, including economies of scale.
13 The international evidence also points toward the existence of scale economies only for small and medium-sized
banks, Amel, Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo (2004). Allen and Liu (2007), on the other hand, report economies of scale
for the six largest Canadian banks.
14 Restrepo and Kumbhakar (2013) using data for all U.S. commercial banks from 2001 to 2010 also document
constant RTS for most U.S. banks from 2001-2010.
15 The results for large banks are comparable to those in Feng and Serletis (2010)
16 See Hughes et al (2001) and Hughes and Mester (2010) on the impact of using different models on estimates of
TFP components (e.g. scale economies, efficiency, technical change, etc.).
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3.1 The Model
We use a nonparametric cost function with Q outputs, K inputs, and P environmental/control variables
to account for some bank-specific characteristics. The cost function for bank i at time t has the following
general specification:
Cit = Ait ·Bi ·H(Wit, Yit, t, Zit) (1)
where Cit represents actual cost, Ait is a productivity parameter, Bi is a parameter capturing time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity across banks (fixed-effects), H(·) is a nonparametric function of
Wit, a vector of input prices, Yit, a vector of output quantities, and Zit, a vector of control variables.
We impose homogeneity restrictions on input prices by dividing costs and input prices by the price
of input K, i.e., WK . Thus, the cost function becomes:
C˜it = Ait ·Bi ·H(W˜it, Yit, t, Zit) (2)
where W˜k = Wk/WK and C˜it = C/WK . Taking logarithm to (2) and denoting lnH(·) = f(·), we can
write:
ln C˜it = f(W˜it, Yit, t, Zit) + lnAit + lnBi (3)
Dropping the subscripts and taking the total derivative of (3), we get the following growth formulation:
d ln C˜
dt
=
∂f
∂t
+
K−1∑
k=1
∂f
∂ ln W˜k
· d ln W˜k
dt
+
Q∑
q=1
∂f
∂ lnYq
· d lnYq
dt
+
P∑
p=1
∂f
∂Zp
· dZp
dt
+
∂ lnA
∂t
(4)
We write (4) in a more compact way to get our estimating growth equation:
˙˜
C = β0(·) +
K−1∑
k=1
βk(·) ˙˜Wk +
Q∑
q=1
γq(·)Y˙q +
P∑
p=1
ϕp(·)∇tZp + u (5)
where, in generic terms, X˙ = d lnX/dt and ∇tX = dX/dt. We interpret u = ∂ lnA/∂t as an error term
capturing productivity shocks and establish the following mapping for the functional coefficients:
β0(·) = ∂f
∂t
; βk(·) = ∂f
∂ ln W˜k
; γq(·) = ∂f
∂ lnYq
; ϕp(·) = ∂f
∂Zp
(6)
Note that all the functional coefficients in (5) (i.e., β0(·), βk(·), γq(·), and ϕp(·)) are functions of
W˜it, Yit, t, Zit. Further, the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across banks, represented by the
fixed-effects parameters lnBi in (4), are removed in the growth formulation of the cost function in
(5). Finally, the functional coefficients have clear economic meaning. This is shown by relating them
to TFP growth and its components in the next subsection.
3.2 Total Factor Productivity Change
We start with the standard definition of TFP change (see Denny, Fuss, and Waverman 1979):
˙TFP ≡
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q −
K∑
k=1
SkX˙k (7)
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where Rq denotes the revenue share of each output (q = 1, ..., Q) and Sk the cost share of each input
(k = 1, ...,K). In Appendix A we show that TFP growth can be expresed as:
˙TFP ≡ −β0(·) +
Q∑
q=1
(Rq − γq(·))Y˙q +
K−1∑
k=1
(Sk − βk(·)) ˙˜Wk −
P∑
p=1
ϕp(·)∇tZp − u (8)
The first term is the TFP growth’s technical change component (TC = −∂fˆ/∂t = −βˆ0(·)) which
captures shifts of the estimated cost function over time (percentage change in cost over time, ceteris
paribus). TC < 0 indicates technical progress (cost diminution). A positive value of TC will indicate
technical regress. The second term (SC =
∑Q
q=1(Rq−γq(·))Y˙q) can be decomposed into two components
by expressing it as (RTS − 1)∑Qq=1 γq(·)Y˙q +∑Qq=1(Rq − γq(·)/Γ (·))Y˙q where Γ (·) = ∑q γq(·), and
RTS = [Γ (·)]−1. The first part of it clearly depends on RTS and the second part depends on mark-up
(departure of output prices from their respective marginal costs).
The third term (AL =
∑K−1
k=1 (Sk − βk(·))
˙˜
Wk) corresponds to the allocative component because it
captures the effects of non-optimal input allocation (deviation of input mix from the optimal). The
fourth term (EX = −∑Pp=1 ϕp(·)∇tZp) captures the effect of other factors such as output quality, risk,
and other variables. Finally, the last term (−u) is viewed as a productivity shock component which
can increase/decrease TFP growth. We assume it to be random with mean zero, and can be measured
residually. Note that the TFP growth components are nonparametric functions that can be computed
after estimating (5).
3.3 Econometric Model
We estimate the functional coefficients in (5) using three different models. First, note that f(·) in (5)
can be thought of as an unknown smooth function of t, ln W˜k, lnYq, and Zp, then its gradients, i.e.,
β0, βk, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K−1, γq, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q, and ϕp, ∀p = 1, . . . , P , are also unknown smooth functions
of these variables as shown in (6). Thus, (5) can be viewed as the SPSC model of Li et al (2002)
where the model is linear in the
˙˜
Wk, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, Y˙q, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q, and ∇tZp, ∀p = 1, . . . , P ,
variables. To simplify notation, we rewrite (5) (after adding the subscript i and t for observation in
the cross-sectional and time dimension, respectively) as
Yit = X ′itΨ(Zit) + uit (9)
where Yit = ˙˜Cit; X ′it = [1, ˙˜W 1it, . . . , ˙˜WK−1 it, Y˙1it, . . . , Y˙Qit,∇tZ1it, . . . ,∇tZPit],
Z ′it = [ln W˜1it, . . . , ln W˜K−1 it, lnY1it, . . . , lnYQit, tit, Z1it, . . . , ZPit]; and
Ψ ′(·) = [β0(·), β1(·), . . . , βK−1(·), γ1(·), . . . , γQ(·), ϕ1(·), . . . , ϕP (·)]. We call this model the semiparamet-
ric growth model (SPG model). Appendix B shows the details of its estimation.
Second, we estimate (5) assuming that the underlying technology can be represented by a translog
cost function. In this case, the functional coefficients in (5) are parametric functions of [Wit, Yit, t, Zit]
that can be estimated by OLS (see equation (A-13) in Appendix B). We call this model the parametric
growth model (PG model).17
Third, to make our results comparable to the previous literature, we estimate the cost function (1)
instead of (5) assuming that the underlying technology can be represented by a translog cost function.
17 Using both the SPG and PG models, we avoid the incidental parameter problem. Consistency of the functional
coefficients follow from the standard SPSC model (Li et al 2002) and the standard linear panel data models as the
number of observations grow to infinity.
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However, unlike the PG model, equation (1) does not control for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity across banks, see Appendix B. After estimating the coefficients, we compute the functional
coefficients in (5). We call this model the parametric log model (PL model).
The three models described above (SPG model, PG model, and PL model) differ in terms of their
assumptions about the data generating process and the functional form of the underlying technology.
Contrary to the PL model, both the SPG and PG models control for time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity across banks. Unlike the SPG model, the PG model assumes a parametric and common
technology across banks. The functional coefficients of the SPG model are fully nonparametric while
the PG and PL models’ functional coefficients are parametric functions. In this sense the SPG model
is the most general among the three.
3.4 Data
We focus on the post-deregulation period of the U.S. banking industry to isolate economies of scale
estimates from previous regulatory restrictions that may have blocked banks ability to grow. We include
the recent financial crisis to investigate how economies of scale of the biggest U.S. banks were affected
during this period. Our sample covers 60,868 bank-year observations for 7,473 commercial banks from
2001 to 2010. We exclude Bank Holding Companies (BHC) which, given their idiosyncrasies, may
not be comparable with most U.S. commercial banks. However, as a robustness check, we conduct a
separate study regarding these institutions. Also, although quarterly data are available for balance-
sheet figures, we do not believe that each quarterly observation reflects banks’ economic behavior over
the year. Hence, we take quarterly averages of balance-sheet figures to compute yearly observations.18
Our approach incorporates a large sample of banks, a nonparametric specification of the cost function,
fully flexible interactions among the explanatory variables, and includes off-balance sheet activities,
nonperforming loans, and equity capital as additional control variables.19
We use data from the Report of Conditions and Income (Call Reports) from the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago. We include all FDIC insured commercial banks with available data between 2001Q1
and 2010Q4. We exclude banks reporting negative values for assets, equity, outputs and prices, stand
alone internet banks, commercial banks conducting primarily credit card activities, and banks char-
tered outside continental U.S. territory. Our data set is an unbalanced panel with 63,120 bank-year
observations for 8,483 banks. We deflate all nominal quantities using the 2005 Consumer Price Index
for all urban consumption published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
18 We use quarterly averages for balance-sheet figures only since end-of-year balance-sheet figures may differ from the
average balance-sheet amounts a bank maintains over the year. For instance, if during the first three quarters a bank
has $1 Billion in outstanding loans but this amount is reduced significantly in the fourth quarter to $800 million, the
end-of-year amount will underestimate the total amount of loans that contributed to generate the reported interest
income. In the case of balance-sheet figures used to estimate input prices, using end-of-year as opposed to quarterly
averages, will lead to over-estimate them. To clarify, the approach used is to sum up the end-of-quarter figures within
a specific year and divide the result by 4. We do not do this for income statement figures since end-of-year numbers
are the figures we need.
19 Risk complicates the analysis of a bank’s production technology. Differences across banks regarding risk most
likely lead to differences in variable cost. Without accounting for risk the assumption of cost minimization may be
inappropriate. We try to account for risk taking by including some control variables like equity capital, nonperforming
loans, and off-balance sheet activities which are likely to be informative regarding banks’ risk taking. This is the
standard approach in the literature. A more desirable approach would be to account for endogenous risk taking as in
Hughes and Mester (2013) and Malikov et al (2014). Nonetheless, doing so will highly complicate our nonparametric
estimation strategy. The results on Hughes and Mester (2013) and Malikov et al (2014) suggests that RTS estimates
are downward bias when risk taking is not taking into account. So, we believe our results can be seen as a lower
bound for economies of scale estimates.
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Our method is computationally demanding. To avoid extreme outliers, we use data for which
output quantities and input prices fall between 0.5% and the 99.5% of their empirical distributions.
In addition, we only consider banks with at least four years of available data from 2001 to 2010. To
get annual values, we compute the quarterly average of balance-sheet nominal (stock) values. As a
result, we have 60,868 bank-year observations for 7,473 different banks. Our growth formulation further
decreases the number of observation to 51,966 bank-year observations for 7,381 banks. However, this
growth formulation removes the bank-specific fixed-effects, and therefore it does not impose any extra
cost in reducing degrees of freedom.
To estimate our model, we must map banks’ activities to outputs and input quantities and their
corresponding prices. We follow the literature and model bank activities using the balance-sheet ap-
proach of Sealey and Lindley (1977). In this framework, a bank’s balance-sheet captures the essential
structure of banks’ core business: (i) liabilities, together with physical capital and labor, are inputs
into the bank production process and (ii) assets, other than physical assets, are outputs. Liabilities are
composed of core deposits and purchased funds. Assets include loans and trading securities. Therefore,
banks use labor, physical capital, and debt to produce loans, invest in financial assets, and facilitate
other financial services.
We define five output variables: household and individual loans (Y1), real estate loans (Y2), business
loans (Y3), securities (e.g., federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell) (Y4),
and other assets (Y5). These outputs are essentially the same as those used in Berger and Mester (2003).
We define five input variables: labor (e.g., number of full-time equivalent employees at the end of
each quarter) (X1), physical capital (e.g. premises and fixed assets including capitalized leases) (X2),
purchased funds (e.g., time deposits of $100,000 or more, federal funds purchased and securities sold
under agreements to repurchase, total trading liabilities, other borrowed money, and subordinated
notes and debentures) (X3), interest-bearing transaction accounts (X4), and core deposits other than
interest-bearing transaction accounts or time deposits of $100,000 or more (X5). The price of each
input, Wj for j = 1, ..., 5, is computed by dividing total expenses by the corresponding input quantity.
20
Total costs, C, equals the sum of expenses on each of the five inputs. Total revenue equals the sum of
revenues for each output category. Table 1 presents summary statistics for outputs, inputs, and input
prices.
[ Table 1 approximately here ]
Table 1 also presents information on cost, revenue, and output shares. On the revenue side, real
estate loans account for 41.6% of total banks’ revenues (R2), loan to business and other institutions
20.5% (R3), securities 15.3% (R4), and other assets 16.1% (R5). Loans to individuals and households
account for 6% (R1) of total revenue. On the cost side, labor input accounts for 41.3% of total costs
(S1), non-transaction accounts expenditures represent 29.2% (S5), premises and fixed assets 10.3%
(S2), purchased funds 16.6%(S3), and transaction accounts 2.6% (S4). In addition, Table 1 also reports
output shares for each output category, SYi; and the share of total loans on total output, SY123. In
addition, we include the log of total equity capital (Z1) as a a quasi-fixed netput, a proxy for off-
balance sheet activities (Z2: noninterest income over total income), and a proxy for output quality
(Z3: non performing loans).
20 We treat physical capital as a variable input and compute its price for each year as the ratio between expenses
of premises and fixed assets over the quarterly average of total premises and fixed assets. Ideally, one should use the
opportunity cost of such assets for this computation. We believe, however, that since expenses of premises and fixed
assets include all non-interest expenses related to the use of premises and fixed assets, including capitalized leases,
net of their rental income, our approach may reasonably resemble the opportunity cost of using such assets.
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4 Empirical Results
Both the SPG model and the PG models fit the data quite well (the R2 values for these models are
0.978, 0.916).21 The PG model is a restricted version of the SPG model. Thus, we can test if the data
support the parametric restrictions imposed by the PG model. Using the specification test of Li and
Racine (2010), we reject the PG model in favor of the SPG model specification.22 Thus, on statistical
grounds our preferred specification is the SPG model. However, our findings regarding economies of
scale and TFP growth components from the SPG and PG models are quite similar. For completeness
and comparability with the literature, we present parameters, economies of scale, and TFP growth
components estimates from all three models.
4.1 Estimated Functional Coefficients
The functional coefficients from the SPG model are fully nonparametric and have clear economic
meaning. As mentioned before β0(·) captures shifts of the cost function (percentage change in cost,
ceteris paribus). Similarly, each βk(·) represents the cost elasticity of input price k—cost shares. The
γq(·) coefficients capture the cost elasticity of outputs and are uniquely related to economies of scale.
Finally, the ϕp(·) coefficients measure the effects of the control variables on the percentage change
in cost. We present summary statistics for the functional coefficients estimates in Table 2 and their
empirical distributions in Figure 1.
[ Table 2 and Figure 1 approximately here ]
It can be seen from Table 2 that mean TC is almost zero in SPG and PL models. However looking
at the mean might give a misleading impression. A closer look at TC in the PL model shows that it
is almost zero for each percentile while for the SPG model there is technical progress (negative TC)
for almost half of the banks while for the other half there is technical regress. These opposing forces
resulted in a technical regress of 0.1% per annum. On the other hand, the PG model shows technical
progress ranging from 2.1% to 0.00%, for more than 75% of the banks. On average, technical progress
took place at the rate of 1% per annum.
By Shephard’s lemma, the coefficients βˆk(·) = ∂ lnC/∂ lnWk, are cost shares estimates for each
input, k = 1, 2, 3, 4. The mean and the empirical distributions of βˆk(·) from the SPG and PG models
are similar and closely follow the observed cost shares shown in Table 2. The estimates from the PL
model follow a similar pattern but their empirical distributions differ significantly. Negative values for
βˆk(·), k = 1, 2, 3, 4., indicate violations of regularity conditions since cost shares are positive. Tables
3 and 4 show that most βˆk(·) are positive. For the SPG model the violations are less than 0.5% for
βˆ1(·) and βˆ3(·), and around 6% for βˆ2(·) and βˆ4(·). For the PG model, the violations are less than
0.5% for all βˆk(·). The PL model has the largest number of violations, 27% and 11.5% for βˆ2(·) and
βˆ4(·), respectively. Our results imply that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using the SPG or
the PG models reduces the number of violations significantly.
[ Tables 3 and 4 approximately here ]
Estimated cost elasticity with respect to each output is given by γˆq(·). We expect these coefficients
to have a positive sign since both marginal and average costs are positive. In fact, this is the case for
21 The fit of the PL model (R2) is not comparable to the other two models because the dependent variables are not
the same. The R2 of the PL model is 0.847.
22 We use 99 bootstrap replications which gave a p-value of almost zero.
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most observations. Estimates of γq(·) from the PG model are negative for less than 0.8% of all obser-
vations. The SPG model shows negative values for γˆ2(·) to γˆ4(·) for less than 1.2% of the observations.
The corresponding values for γˆ1(·) and γˆ5(·) are 5.6% and 6.25%. Overall, the PL model gives negative
values for γˆk(·) for less than 6% of the observations. The low number of violations for the SPG model
is remarkable since its estimated coefficients are fully nonparametric functions. Better performance of
the PG model in this regard suggests that the PG model is a good approximation of the underlying
technology. We consider that the number of sign violations for the estimated coefficients βˆk(·) and
γˆk(·) using the SPG and PG models are low. Thus, we do not restrict their signs.23
The ϕˆp(·) = ∂fˆ/∂Zp coefficients capture the effects of log of equity capital (Z1), off-balance sheet
activities (Z2), and non-performing loans (Z3) on log total cost. More specifically, ϕˆ1(·) represents
cost elasticity of equity capital, while ϕˆp(·), p = 2, 3 represents semi cost elasticity of off-balance sheet
activities and non-performing loans. For the SPG and PG models, the estimated mean effects are all
positive, indicating that increases in any of these variables to produce a given level of outputs increase
total cost, ceteris paribus.24
It is noteworthy that all the estimated functional coefficients are well behaved as shown by their
empirical distributions (Figure 1). This is particularly remarkable for the nonparametric functional
coefficients of the SPG model since they are completely unconstrained. The functional coefficients
in all three models are observation-specific. Thus, we compute their standard errors using the wild
bootstrap method of Hardle and Mammen (1993). Figure 2 shows the observation-specific functional
coefficient estimates from the SPG model along with their 95% confidence intervals. Unreported results
show a similar pattern for the PG and PL models.
[ Figure 2 approximately here ]
To understand these figures, consider the plot for the estimated functional coefficients βˆ0(·) in
Figure 2. We plot βˆ0(·) against βˆ0(·) such that all the coefficients βˆ0(·) lie along the 45◦ line. The
points above (below) the 45◦ line represent the upper (lower) bound of each confidence interval.
Therefore, for each β0(·) on the 45◦ line we can see an observation-specific confidence interval. If the
horizontal line at zero passes inside of the confidence bounds for any given observation, then β0(·) for
this observation is statistically insignificant. Conversely, if the horizontal line at zero passes outside
of the confidence bounds, then β0(·) for this observation is statistically significant. In addition, if the
lower (upper) bound lies above (below) zero, then the coefficient for this observation is significantly
positive (negative). In general, the confidence intervals for each of the functional coefficients are quite
tight, although they become wider at the tails.
4.2 Economies of Scale
We present summary statistics for economies of scale estimates using the SPG, PG, and PL models in
Panels A, B, and C of Table 5. Figures 3 and 4 show their empirical distributions. We find economically
and statistically significant scale economies, as measured by RTS, for most banks. For the SPG model
(Panel A), mean RTS estimate is 1.42, indicating that if outputs were to increase by 10%, total costs
will increase approximately by 7% (10% × 1/1.42). Mean RTS estimates from the PG model (Panel
23 Such an exercise is beyond the scope of the present. We leave this for future research.
24 The positive relationship between the growth in variable cost and equity capital suggests that to produce a
given output vector with more equity capital banks also spend more on variable inputs. Apart from possible agency
problems, two potential and important explanations could be that to do so banks spend more on either reducing
or taking on more risk. If nonperforming loans are a valid proxy for realized credit risk, the positive relationship
between variable cost and nonperforming loans seems to be consistent with the latter explanation. This discussion is
not central to our paper and since it deserves a deeper analysis we left it for future research.
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B) is 1.40. These results indicate presence of increasing RTS (IRTS) for most banks. The mean RTS
from the PL model (Panel C) is 1.01, indicating constant RTS (CRTS). The empirical distribution of
estimated RTS from the SPG or PG models show decreasing RTS for less than 2% of the observations.
In contrast, estimated RTS from the PL model show decreasing RTS (DRTS) for about 42% of the
observations.
[ Table 5 approximately here ]
[ Figures 3 and 4 approximately here ]
Estimated RTS decrease with bank size, see Table 5.25 Mean RTS for small, medium, and big
banks are 1.56, 1.34, and 1.18 from the SPG model and 1.54, 1.32, and 1.10 from the PG model. Mean
RTS for the top 100 banks are also lower than for all other banks. Estimated RTS from the SPG and
PG models show that almost all medium and small banks exhibit IRTS. More than 75% of big banks
and more than 50% of the top 100 banks also exhibit IRTS. Estimates RTS from the PL model show
IRTS for about 50% of banks.26
The RTS estimates from the SPG and the PG model are directly comparable in the sense that
both models controls for fixed bank-specific effects. This is, however, not the case with the PL model.
Thus the differences in RTS estimates in the PL model from the other two models might be attributed
to ignoring bank-specific effects. Estimated RTS from the PL model are both statistically and eco-
nomically smaller than those from the PG model, indicating that failure to account for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity conceals the evidence of substantial scale economies for most banks.
Now we investigate the statistical significance of our RTS estimates. In Figure 5, we depict the
estimated 95% confidence intervals for RTS estimates by bank size for each model. In Table 6, we report
the percentage of observations exhibiting statistically significant increasing, decreasing, or constant
RTS. For each plot in Figure 5, points above (below) the 45◦ line represent the upper (lower) bounds of
observation-specific confidence intervals. Points on the 45◦ line are the estimated RTS. If the horizontal
line at one passes inside of the confidence bounds for any given observation, then RTS estimate for
this observation is statistically equal to one (CRTS). If the lower (upper) bound lies above (below)
one, then the RTS estimate for this observation is significantly greater (less) than one, indicating IRTS
(DRTS).
[ Figure 5 approximately here ]
The confidence intervals in Figure 5 are consistent with the existence of IRTS for most banks
reported above. In the SPG model, 98% of the observations for medium and small banks show pres-
ence of IRTS. The corresponding values for big and the top one hundred banks are 75% and 65%,
respectively (see Table 6). Only 2% of the observations for medium and small banks show presence of
CRTS and none shows evidence of DRTS. Only 13% of the big banks and 26% of the top one hundred
banks show evidence of DRTS.
[ Table 6 approximately here ]
The evidence from the PG model is consistent with the results from the SPG model, except for the
top one hundred banks. The estimates from the PG model show evidence of IRTS for 100%, 74%, and
23% of medium and small banks, big banks, and the top one hundred banks, respectively. In contrast,
estimates from the PL model show no evidence of IRTS for most banks.
25 We classify banks by total assets as follows: Big (assets > $1 billion), medium ($100 million < assets < $1
billion), and small (assets < $100 million) banks. The top 100 banks correspond to the 100 biggest banks by assets
each year. This classification is typically used in the literature (see Feng and Serletis, 2009)
26 RTS estimates from the SPG model has more extreme values than those from the PG model. This is expected
from a nonparametric model. That is, the distribution of RTS from the PG model is quite tight.
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We plot the relation between RTS estimates and bank size in Figure 6 for the SPG and PG models.
RTS estimates from the SPG and PG models decrease monotonically as bank size increases. There is a
clear inverse relation between RTS and bank size — measured by size deciles. The interquartile range
of RTS estimates tend to be wider for the smallest and the biggest banks. Unreported results show
that the empirical distribution of bank size is almost the same for the biggest one hundred banks that
exhibit either increasing or decreasing RTS. Thus, for the biggest one hundred banks (as measured
by total assets) RTS estimates are unrelated to bank size, suggesting that some of these banks will
continue growing irrespective of their actual size.
[ Figure 6 approximately here ]
Table 7 presents additional results concerning the distribution of RTS for the biggest ten banks in
our sample from 2001 to 2010. RTS estimates for these banks are lower for the crisis years (2007-2009).
We investigate this issue further by estimating the SPG model using dummy variables for the crisis
years and including in the sample only banks with more than $500 million in assets (results not shown).
We find that RTS estimates are also lower during the crisis years but the fall in their magnitude is not
as pronounced. Thus, there seem no to be a significant change in banks’ cost structure during those
years.
[ Table 7 approximately here ]
Based on transition probability matrices (not reported), we find that RTS estimates from the SPG
model are stable over time. The likelihood of remaining within the same RTS decile or switching
to the two adjacent RTS deciles are around 70% for the SPG model and 90% for the PG model,
suggesting that the RTS estimates from the PG model are more stable over time. This may stem from
the parametric assumptions underlying the PG model. In contrast, the SPG model RTS estimates are
fully nonparametric. Nonetheless, the probabilities of switching across deciles that are farther away
from each other are small for both models, indicating that there are no large swings on the estimated
RTS. Unreported piece-wise Spearman rank correlations show that the rank correlation for adjacent
years are high for both the SPG and the PG model (above 0.75 and 0.98, respectively). These results
are consistent with the transition probabilities matrix analysis discussed before and may stem from the
fact that the parametric specification imposes stronger restrictions on the dynamics of RTS estimates
in contrast to the fully nonparametric RTS estimates from the SPG model.
4.3 TFP Growth and its Components
We compute TFP growth (the Divisia) from ˙TFP ≡∑Qq=1RqY˙q −∑Kk=1 SkX˙k. Note that the Divisia
can be computed directly from the data without estimating any econometric model. In order to
decompose it into technical change, scale, allocative, control, and random components using (8), we
need to estimate the components econometrically. That is, in an econometric model one estimates
the components and then adds them to compute TFP growth. Table 8 summarizes the results and
Figure 7 presents density estimates for TFP growth and its components. The first row of each panel
in Table 8 corresponds to the estimated TFP annual growth rate. Since the SPG and PG models use
a growth formulation, TFP growth rates differ from the Divisia TFP growth rate only by the random
component which has a zero mean. This is why TFP growth obtained from adding the components
equals the Divisia index. This is, however, not the case in the PL model in which the error term is
not the same as the last component of TFP growth in (8).27
27 See Kumbhakar and Sun (2012) for a discussion on this issue based on an input distance function formulation.
Obelix vs. Asterix: Size of U.S. Commercial Banks and Its Regulatory Challenge 15
[ Table 8 approximately here ]
[ Figure 7 approximately here ]
Average annual TFP growth rate is 3.1% with a standard deviation of 8.3%. Average TFP growth
using either the SPG or the PG model equals the average Divisia TFP growth rate but its standard
deviation is lower, reflecting the absence of the random component. Average TFP annual growth rate
using the PL model is 1.1% with a standard deviation of 8.4%. Since the the PL model uses data in
logs, it fits total cost changes less accurately, resulting in a large unexplained component (which is
zero on average in both the SPG and PG models). Thus, TFP growth rate estimates from the PL
model is likely to differ from the Divisia TFP growth rates.28
The top left panel of Figure 8 shows estimated average annual TFP growth rate over time for the
Divisia and the three econometric models. TFP growth rates are positive over the sample period for
the Divisia, the SPG and PG models. TFP growth rates are higher from 2007 to 2010 than from 2002
to 2006. This pattern coincides with the U.S. financial crisis period. However, except for an increase
in the elasticity of cost with respect to real estate loans, there is no apparent change in the cost
structure for most banks. 29 This result holds for the Divisia, the SPG and PG models. In contrast,
TFP growth rate estimates using the PL model overestimate TFP growth rates from 2002 to 2006 and
underestimate TFP growth from 2007 onwards. Compared with 2001 levels, the TFP indexes from
the Divisia, the SPG and PG models increase about 33% by 2010 (see the top right plot in Figure 8).
The PL model’s TFP index shows that the increase was only about 11%. SPG model’s average annual
TFP growth rate for big, medium, and small banks are 3.9%, 3.1%, and 3%, respectively. For the PG
model, the corresponding values are 3.3%, 3.3%, and 2.9%; and for the PL model they are 1.6%, 1%,
and 1.1%.
[ Figure 8 approximately here ]
Taken together, these results suggest that estimating the underlying parameters of the cost func-
tion without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may lead to biased estimates of TFP growth
components. In particular, in the PL model the mean difference between the annual total cost change
and its estimate is −2%. This is exactly the difference between the average TFP growth estimated
from the PL model and the Divisia. Therefore, without controlling for time-invariant unobserved het-
erogeneity, the parameter estimates of the underlying cost function are biased. As a consequence, the
PL model attributes most of the TFP growth to the random component. Now we focus on the sources
of TFP growth by examining each component separately.
4.3.1 Scale Economies
The scale component of TFP in (8),
∑Q
q=1(Rq − γq)Y˙q, can be rewritten as (RTS − 1)
∑Q
q=1 γq(·)Y˙q +∑Q
q=1(Rq − γq(·)/Γ (·))Y˙q where Γ (·) =
∑
q γq(·). The presence of scale economies (IRTS) contributes
positively to TFP growth if output growth rates (Y˙q), weighted by the elasticity of cost with respect
to each output (γq), are positive. If the marginal cost for each output equals the corresponding output
price, then Rq = γq/Γq which means
∑Q
q=1(Rq−γq/Γq)Y˙q = 0. If not, this component will be non-zero
and can be interpreted as the mark-up component. The means of this mark-up component for the
SPG, PG, and PL models are 0.6%, 0.3%, and 0.2%, respectively.
28 This finding is not new in the TFP growth literature. For example, see Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) and
the references cited in there.
29 As one of the anonymous referees notice, these results could be of independent interest. We leave a throughout
analysis of them for future research.
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The mean of the scale component estimates equals 2.2%, 1.8%, and 0.2% for the SPG, PG, and
PL models, respectively. Thus, on average, economies of scale contribute positively to TFP growth.
Compared with medium and small banks, the contribution of scale economies to TFP growth is higher
for big banks.
The positive contribution indicates that, on average, Rq − γq(·) ≥ 0, which means that the effects
of output price changes on total revenue are higher than the corresponding effects of output quantity
changes on cost (i.e., a 1% change in a given output causes a proportional change in total cost that
is lower than the proportional change in total revenue caused by a 1% increase in the corresponding
output price.)
The lower-left plot of Figure 8 shows that the scale component for the SPG and PG models are
similar. The SPG scale component tends to grow faster, however, reflecting the higher RTS obtained
using the SPG model. This plot also shows that the differences in estimated RTS between the SPG
and PG model are small and their contributions to TFP growth are comparable.
Our results strongly support the hypothesis that most U.S. commercial banks enjoy substantial
economies of scale. Our nonparametric RTS estimates (SPG model) indicate that, on average, more
than 98% of banks experience increasing RTS. However, we reject the hypothesis of increasing RTS
for 26% of the observations for the biggest U.S. banks.
4.3.2 Technical Change
From (8), the contribution of TC to TFP growth is −β0(·) = −∂fˆ/∂t. Estimates of TC from the
SPG and the PG models show an annual rate of technical change about −0.1% and 1%, respectively
(see Table 2). Results from these two models also show that big banks experience higher rates of TC
than medium and small banks. Mean TC from the SPG model are 0.6%, −0.1%, and −0.1%, for big,
medium, and small banks, respectively. The corresponding values from the PG model are 1.7%, 0.9%,
and 1%.
These differences lead to different temporal paths of TC as shown in the left-middle plot of Figure
8. Estimates of TC from the PG model show that banks experience substantial gains in TFP growth.
The SPG model suggests that total cost remains essentially unchanged from 2001 to 2010, ceteris
paribus. Given that the SPG model imposes fewer constraints on the model and therefore on the
dynamics of TC, we take the results from this model more seriously.
4.3.3 Allocative Component
TFP growth is also affected by deviations of actual input cost shares, Sk, from the optimal input
cost shares, βk. This happens when banks fail to allocate inputs optimally. The allocative component,
AL =
∑K−1
k=1 (Sk − βk)
˙˜
Wk, captures the contribution of such input misallocations (over- or under-use
of inputs) on TFP growth. If Sk = βk, k = 1, ..., 4, then there is no input mis-allocation and therefore
AL = 0. The sign on AL depends on the extent of input mis-allocation as well as rate of change in
relative inputprices.
The average contribution of AL in the SPG and PG models are 1.7% and 0.7%, with standard
deviation of 4.2% and 3.8%. For the PL model it is 0.8% with a standard deviation of 5.7%. Figure
8 shows the temporal behavior of AL in the three models. The AE component from the SPG model
shows an increase of about 17% during 2001 to 2010. The corresponding values for the PG and PL
models are about 6% and 7%, respectively. The AL component from the SPG model show a steady
increase during the sample period. On the other hand, the PG and PL models show increases up to
2004, decreases for 2005 and 2006, and steady gains thereafter. The estimates from all three models
indicate allocative efficiency gains from 2007 to 2010.
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Gains from AL predicted by the SPG model are 2% for big banks, 1.6% for medium, and 1.8% for
small banks. The corresponding values from the PG model are 0.8%, 0.7%, and 0.7%, respectively. In
contrast, the estimates from the PL model are about 0.8% regardless of bank size.
4.3.4 Component attributed to environmental factors
TFP growth can also be affected by factors other than technical change, allocative efficiency, and scale
economies. We consider three such environmental factors, viz., (log) equity capital (Z1), non-traditional
activities (off-balance sheet activities: Z2), and non-performing loans (Z3). The contribution of these
control/environmental variables to TFP growth is capture by EX = −∑Pp=1 ϕp(·)∇tZp in (8). The
EX values for the SPG and PG models follow a similar pattern over time. Average values of EX from
the SPG and PG models are small but negative, −0.7% and −0.4%, with standard deviations of 2.5%
and 1.2%, respectively. Thus, these environmental variables contribute negatively to TFP growth.
However, their effects are small compared with the other components. The last plot in Figure 8 shows
that the cumulative effect of the environmental variables for the 2001 to 2010 period based on the
SPG model is about −6% and is about −3% predicted by the PG model. On the other hand, the PL
model show that the EX component contributed positively to TFP growth.
To summarize the results of the preceding section, TFP grew about 33% during 2001 to 2010.
According to the SPG model the main drivers of TFP growth were scale economies and allocative
efficiency which account for 21.5% and 17.3%, respectively, of TFP growth during this period.
The trend of TFP growth for big, medium, and small banks is similar. However, big banks expe-
rience sharper swings in TFP growth than medium and small banks. TFP grew steadily for all banks
from 2001 to 2010 with some periods of deceleration. TFP grew 44.6% , 32.2%, and 32.3% for big,
medium, and small banks. During 2008 to 2010, TFP growth for big banks was 1.5 times higher than
for medium and small banks.
Unlike previous studies, our framework allows us to tie the functional coefficients of our models to
TFP growth components, allowing us to investigate the main forces explaining U.S. banking industry
growth. Our results show that increasing returns to scale played an important role in explaining growth
of the U.S. banking industry. By comparison, the role of technical change is smaller. These results
are consistent with recent evidence presented by Diewert and Fox (2008) for the U.S. manufacturing
industry.
5 Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks to challenge our results. As pointed out by DeYoung (2010),
evidence of scale economies for big banks may be driven by inclusion of very small banks in the
estimation. Thus, we re-estimated the SPG model using data for commercial banks with assets in
excess of $500 million. In this case, median scale economies estimates falls to 1.16 from 1.37 (see Table
5). For banks with assets in the 90th percentile, median scale economies are slightly higher, 1.18. Thus,
despite the drop in median scale economies for this subsample, there is still strong evidence of scale
economies for even the biggest banks.
We also investigate whether our estimates change when controlling by the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. We re-estimated the SPG model including data for commercial banks with assets in excess of
$500 million and included a dummy variable for the crisis years. Except for an increase in the elasticity
of total costs with respect to real estate loans for the biggest banks, our results indicate no change in
the cost structure of banks during the crisis years. RTS estimates in this case are slightly lower but
the results are still consistent with substantial scale economies.
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Selecting/including output categories appropriately is an important issue in measuring scale economies.
Off-Balance-Sheet (OBS) activities accounts for an important part of non-interest income for banks
which suggests including it as an output and not as a control variable. We conducted a separate es-
timation for large commercial banks with assets greater than $500 million including OBS activities
(with the level of non-interest income as a proxy) as an additional output.30 Compared with the results
presented previously in Table 5, OBS has a very small impact on our estimates of RTS. Without OBS
as an additional output, mean RTS estimate for banks with total assets greater than $1 billion was
1.18. Using OBS as an additional output leads to a mean RTS estimate for these banks of 1.19. In
addition, about 80% of the RTS estimates are greater than 1.05, indicating that a great proportion of
the biggest commercial banks enjoy significant economies of scale. In this sense, the qualitative results
of the paper do not change.
In our previous specifications, we treat nonperforming loans as a control variable for risk and
measure it as a ratio. However, nonperforming loans could be considered as a quasi-fixed input since
to produce more output, especially loans, banks could opt to take on more credit risk. The derivative
of cost with respect to the level of nonperforming loans would indicate its relationship to cost and an
indication of how variable cost varies with realized credit risk. Thus, we re-estimated the model using
nonperforming loans in level as a quasi-fixed input for banks with assets in excess of $500 million. We
find that the overall relation between realized credit risk and variable costs is positive, indicating that
as banks take on more credit risk, variable costs also increase. The inclusion of nonperforming loans
in levels does not change significantly our RTS estimates, however. In addition, we find no specific
pattern on the relationship between realized credit risk and total cost as a function of bank size.
To investigate the consistency of our scale economies estimates with those recently reported in the
literature, we compare them with those in Hughes and Mester (2013) and Wheelock and Wilson (2012).
From their preferred model specification, Hughes and Mester (2013) report mean scale economies as
high as 1.43 for the biggest U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) operating in 2010 (see page 573).
In comparison, our mean scale economies estimate for the top one-hundred banks is 1.12 and for the
ten biggest banks is 1.21 (see Table 7). In addition, Wheelock and Wilson (2012) find that for the 20
biggest BHCs in their sample, scale economies were about 1.25.31 Thus, our results seems lower than
those recently reported in the literature.
We use annual US Call Report data for individual commercial banks. However, several banks
operate under a BHC. Hence, a BHC may conduct its subsidiary banks as part of an overall business
strategy. Thus, investigating scale economies at the commercial bank level may not capture the overall
BHC strategy and cannot account for the dependence between multiple institutions owned by the same
BHC. Thus, our empirical results are to be interpreted in the context of commercial banks only. We
re-estimated the model using data for Bank Holding Companies from 2001 to 2010. Contrary to our
results for individual commercial banks, we find that most BHCs exhibit decreasing returns to scale
(the results are available from the authors upon request). Median returns to scale for this sample is
about 0.726. Notably, for the biggest BHCs (those belonging to the 90th decile by asset size) this
estimate is about 0.77. Hence, there are substantial differences between scale economies estimated for
individual banks and those for BHCs.
30 We thank two anonymous referees for this suggestion.
31 Wheelock and Wilson (2012) do not report specific measures of scale economies. However, from their discussion
on page 192 we could back up the value of 1.25 for the biggest 20 BHCs. They explain that by reducing the size of
a BHC like Citibank by a factor of 0.5012 leads to a decrease in costs by a factor 1 − 0.5952. This is equivalent to
a decrease of 0.4008 = 0.5012 × 1/1.2504 = 1 − 0.5952. Equivalently, increasing the size of Citibank by 1%, would
increase its costs by only 0.7997% (1%×1/1.2504). Given the size of Citibank in 2006 (measured by assets) of $1.885
trillion dollars, the 1% increase in total assets ($18.85 billion) will lead to an increase in total costs of $15.07 billion
($18.85× 1/1.2504) which implies scale economies of $3.77 billion.
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6 Regulatory Implications
Despite the wide range of problems recently addressed by enacted financial regulations in the U.S.,
policymakers, regulators, academics, and financial market participants are still pondering the idea of
capping the size of banks, bringing the issue of existence of scale economies to the fore of the policy
debate. If big banks enjoy substantial scale economies, breaking up the biggest banks or capping their
size may impose efficiency losses to the economy.
Wheelock and Wilson (2012) estimate that the cost of breaking the four largest U.S. bank holding
companies in existence in 2010 would hover $79 billion annually. On the other hand, Boyd and Heitz
(2012) estimates that the potential benefits to the society from economies of scale of big financial
institutions are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to increased risk of financial crisis. Our
results have important implications for this debate.
First, our findings suggest that most of the biggest U.S. commercial banks enjoy substantial
economies of scale (Obelix is not obese). However, as evidenced in Table 6, not all the banks with
assets in excess of $1 billion exhibit economies of scale. Further, the RTS estimates for 35% of the ob-
servations belonging to the top one hundred banks are consistent with constant or decreasing RTS.32
For the top ten banks with assets ranging from $47 billion to $1.5 trillion, only 70% of the observations
produce RTS estimates consistent with increasing RTS.33 In particular, of the four banks with assets
above $500 billion, on average, only one bank exhibits increasing RTS during the sampling period
(only 3 obese Obelix). Thus, capping the size of banks around $1 trillion (converting them to Asterix),
for instance, may yield limited social losses from the scale economies viewpoint.
Second, our results indicate that scale economies are likely to continue to be the major driver of
growth for small, medium, and some of the biggest banks. We find that scale economies contribute
significantly to TFP growth, giving strong incentives for banks to keep growing and, to regulators, a
more challenging and difficult task to keep them on lean diet. If regulators want to keep bank size
under control, they will have to consider ways in which banks internalize the associated potential
cost for society. This will likely require imposing endogenous regulatory constraints that increase the
marginal cost of getting bigger above the marginal benefits of getting even bigger.
Third, consolidation of small and medium banks and further growth of some of the biggest banks
pose big challenges to regulators. As overall bank size increases, widespread bank failures can be
more problematic for regulators. Future bank failures will likely involve, on average, bigger and more
interconnected banks. Therefore, regulators should widen the focus of their efforts beyond the biggest
commercial banks and BHCs and look in the direction of smaller banks that have the strongest
incentive to keep growing. In addition, larger average size of banks means stronger barriers to entry
for potential competitors which can greatly affect concentration, competition, and efficiency.
7 Conclusions
Regulators in the U.S. and around the world are still pondering the idea of how to keep bank size in
check. Thus, understanding whether the biggest U.S. banks enjoy economies of scale is important. In
this paper, we offer new nonparametric estimates of scale economies, TFP growth and its components
(technical change, scale, and other environmental variables) for U.S. commercial banks during 2001
to 2010. We show that most, but not all, banks have economic incentives to keep growing since they
32 The banks belonging to the top one hundred banks have assets ranging from $23 to $1.5 trillion.
33 Including the years 2007 and 2008, only 57% of the observations for the top ten biggest banks are consistent with
increasing RTS. Among the top ten biggest banks for each year are State Street Bank and Trust Company, CitiBank,
US Bank, Wachovia, HSBC, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, Fleet National Bank, Suntrust
Bank, Keybank, PNC Bank, Regions Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and Citizens Bank.
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enjoy substantial economies of scale. Even the biggest U.S. commercial banks seem to be below their
optimal size. Thus, further growth and industry consolidation are likely to continue.
Our economies of scale estimates are derived from a novel and more flexible approach than those
used in the previous studies. We start from a nonparametric cost function with fixed bank-specific
effects and derive an estimating equation that is a semiparametric smooth coefficient (SPSC) cost
function. The smooth coefficients are nonparametric (fully flexible) functions of the covariates of
the cost function and therefore the estimates of scale economies, TFP growth, and its components
are nonparametric. We compare the results from the SPSC model with two other models that are
parametric but flexible. These features are absent from most recent studies.
For U.S. commercial banks, we find that around 73% of the top one hundred banks, 98% of medium
and small banks, and seven of the top ten biggest banks by asset size exhibit substantial economies of
scale. In addition, scale economies contribute positively and significantly to their TFP growth. Thus,
the existence of substantial scale economies at commercial banks raises an important challenge for
regulators to pursue size limit regulations. We show that our results for commercial banks are robust
to a alternative model specifications and sampling mechanisms. Our economies of scale estimates are
in line with those appearing in the recent literature.
Unlike previous studies, we find that the major drivers of TFP growth are the scale and allocative
components. Technical change and other factors, like changes in loan quality, risk, and off-balance
sheet activities, affect TFP growth marginally. This reinforces our main conclusions that banks still
have incentives to growth further: doing so contributes positively and significantly to TFP growth.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1 Summary Statistics, 2001-2010
Percentiles
Variable Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Y1 70,358 1,700,000 81.50 655.7 4,532 46,077 137,000,000
Y2 360,000 5,390,000 1,177 5,683 49,638 546,000 404,000,000
Y3 220,000 4,740,000 713.5 2,953 17,131 166,000 348,000,000
Y4 291,000 7,950,000 826.4 4,601 27,012 247,000 782,000,000
Y5 38,042 1,010,000 95.62 308.0 1,595 17,445 89,500,000
X1 226 3,476 3.000 8.500 36.25 296.75 214,000
X2 11,686 146,000 4.000 151.80 2,022 19,613 10,500,000
X3 290,000 6,670,000 24.628 2,519 21,474 272,000 540,000,000
X4 26,307 247,000 56.084 1,757 10,096 53,636 20,000,000
X5 545,000 11,000,000 1,025 10,929 50,047 585,000 763,000,000
W1 52.54 12.99 23.91 36.47 49.99 77.82 117.1
W2 0.346 0.338 0.052 0.104 0.241 0.955 3.406
W3 0.034 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.034 0.053 0.064
W4 0.010 0.007 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.025 0.042
W5 0.026 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.025 0.046 0.055
R 71,765 1,300,000 234 1,792 8,290 78,874 83,600,000
R1 0.065 0.058 0.000 0.007 0.051 0.171 0.913
R2 0.416 0.165 0.000 0.149 0.414 0.693 0.943
R3 0.205 0.147 0.000 0.040 0.164 0.511 0.915
R4 0.153 0.106 0.000 0.027 0.129 0.358 0.961
R5 0.161 0.088 0.001 0.049 0.148 0.312 0.920
C 39,045 758,000 237 978 4,678 43,661 54,100,000
S1 0.413 0.108 0.026 0.247 0.407 0.599 0.877
S2 0.103 0.041 0.001 0.046 0.099 0.177 0.393
S3 0.166 0.089 0.000 0.046 0.154 0.326 0.907
S4 0.026 0.028 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.078 0.447
S5 0.292 0.104 0.011 0.131 0.285 0.473 0.958
SY1 0.058 0.053 0.000 0.006 0.045 0.153 0.879
SY2 0.458 0.173 0.000 0.169 0.460 0.736 0.946
SY3 0.187 0.115 0.000 0.046 0.161 0.416 0.931
SY4 0.281 0.152 0.002 0.074 0.257 0.567 0.960
SY5 0.016 0.009 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.029 0.275
SY123 0.703 0.152 0.024 0.418 0.726 0.910 0.991
Z1 9.513 1.192 6.170 7.903 9.373 11.55 18.85
Z2 0.059 0.065 0.000 0.008 0.040 0.166 0.882
Z3 0.009 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.033 0.472
Tot. Assets 1,050,000 21,000,000 5,888 25,382 115,000 1,080,000 1,520,000,000
This table shows the average (Mean), standard deviation (sd), the median, and the 5 and
95 percentiles (p5 and p95, respectively). All nominal variables are measured in thousands
of 2005 U.S. dollars. The data used for estimation include 60,868 year-bank observations for
7,473 different banks. The output variables are: household and individual loans (Y1), real es-
tate loans (Y2), loans to business and other institutions (Y3), federal funds sold and securities
purchased under agreements to resell (Y4), and other assets (Y5). The input variables are: labor
quantity (X1), premises and fixed assets (X2), purchased funds (X3), interest-bearing trans-
action accounts (X4), and non-transaction accounts (X5). For each input Xj its price, Wj , is
computed by dividing total expenses by the corresponding input quantity. Rev is total rev-
enues, and Rq represents the revenue shares for each output category. Likewise, Sk represents
cost shares for each input category and SYq represents output share for each output category.
SY123 = (Y1 +Y2 +Y3)/(Y1 +Y2 +Y3 +Y4 +Y5). Z1 is log of equity, Z2 is a proxy for off-balance
sheet activities (noninterest income over total income), and Z3 equals nonperforming loans over
total assets.
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Table 2 Estimated Functional Coefficients
Percentiles
Parameter Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Panel A: SPG Model (R2 = .978)
β0 0.001 0.018 -0.022 -0.007 0.000 0.008 0.025
β1 0.456 0.087 0.343 0.402 0.449 0.504 0.594
β2 0.044 0.048 -0.004 0.025 0.039 0.057 0.106
β3 0.164 0.074 0.066 0.118 0.158 0.203 0.288
β4 0.023 0.021 -0.002 0.015 0.023 0.032 0.050
γ1 0.059 0.043 -0.003 0.039 0.060 0.080 0.114
γ2 0.347 0.121 0.163 0.270 0.346 0.418 0.543
γ3 0.124 0.062 0.041 0.085 0.118 0.155 0.225
γ4 0.135 0.059 0.052 0.100 0.132 0.166 0.229
γ5 0.047 0.040 -0.006 0.029 0.046 0.064 0.102
ϕ1 0.075 0.086 -0.048 0.033 0.076 0.119 0.193
ϕ2 0.202 0.256 -0.106 0.077 0.174 0.296 0.615
ϕ3 0.046 1.414 -1.040 -0.226 0.071 0.351 1.155
Panel B: PG Model (R2 = .916)
β0 -0.010 0.007 -0.021 -0.014 -0.009 -0.005 0.000
β1 0.465 0.069 0.360 0.417 0.461 0.509 0.586
β2 0.036 0.014 0.015 0.026 0.035 0.044 0.058
β3 0.176 0.050 0.094 0.144 0.175 0.207 0.257
β4 0.026 0.010 0.009 0.019 0.026 0.032 0.041
γ1 0.053 0.015 0.027 0.045 0.054 0.063 0.076
γ2 0.342 0.123 0.122 0.264 0.352 0.428 0.524
γ3 0.130 0.046 0.052 0.101 0.131 0.160 0.202
γ4 0.154 0.054 0.067 0.120 0.153 0.188 0.243
γ5 0.044 0.011 0.026 0.037 0.044 0.051 0.061
ϕ1 0.062 0.031 0.012 0.041 0.061 0.082 0.114
ϕ2 0.143 0.126 -0.041 0.054 0.131 0.218 0.371
ϕ3 0.057 0.147 -0.178 -0.021 0.064 0.148 0.271
Panel C: PL Model (R2 = .8474)
β0 0.000 0.005 -0.007 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.009
β1 0.392 0.094 0.251 0.325 0.384 0.450 0.561
β2 0.021 0.040 -0.050 -0.003 0.023 0.046 0.082
β3 0.312 0.091 0.163 0.256 0.313 0.368 0.460
β4 0.024 0.020 -0.010 0.012 0.025 0.038 0.056
γ1 0.103 0.047 0.020 0.075 0.107 0.134 0.174
γ2 0.471 0.153 0.211 0.375 0.476 0.574 0.712
γ3 0.149 0.076 0.024 0.100 0.150 0.199 0.271
γ4 0.228 0.106 0.058 0.162 0.227 0.296 0.401
γ5 0.043 0.029 -0.002 0.024 0.042 0.060 0.089
ϕ1 -0.040 0.035 -0.101 -0.061 -0.038 -0.017 0.012
ϕ2 1.227 0.290 0.785 1.057 1.219 1.396 1.709
ϕ3 1.430 0.666 0.400 1.005 1.445 1.910 2.415
The data used for estimation include 60,868 year-bank observations for 7,473 different
banks from 2001 to 2010. SPG model, PG model, and PL model correspond to the estima-
tion of the functional coefficients in equation (5) using the semiparametric smooth coeffi-
cient model (SPSCM), a parametric translog growth model, and the parametric translog
model in levels, respectively.
28 Diego Restrepo-Tobo´n et al.
Table 3 Theoretical Monotonicity Restrictions
% of observations that are non-decreasing in input prices
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
SPG Model 99.96% 94.18% 99.47% 93.86% 99.88%
PG Model 100.00% 99.90% 99.97% 99.45% 100.00%
PL Model 100.00% 72.68% 99.82% 88.57% 98.62%
% of observations that are non-decreasing in outputs
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5
SPG Model 94.39% 99.69% 98.87% 99.39% 93.74%
PG Model 99.65% 99.23% 99.21% 99.51% 99.99%
PL Model 97.52% 99.60% 97.09% 98.12% 93.98%
This table shows the percentage of observations for which total
cost is non-decreasing in input prices and output quantities. The
data used for estimation include 60,868 year-bank observations for
7,473 different banks from 2001 to 2010. SPG model, PG model,
and PL model correspond to the estimation of the functional co-
efficients in equation (5) using the semiparametric smooth coeffi-
cient model (SPSCM), a parametric translog growth model, and
the parametric translog model in levels, respectively.
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Table 4 Hypothesis testings for the coefficient estimates at the 5% level
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4
SPG Model
Significantly positive 24.53% 99.93% 83.21% 98.67% 82.54%
Insignificant 48.82% 0.03% 14.20% 1.02% 14.83%
Significantly negative 26.66% 0.03% 2.60% 0.31% 2.63%
PG Model
Significantly positive 1.04% 100.00% 98.33% 99.88% 96.89%
Insignificant 12.71% 0.00% 1.67% 0.11% 3.09%
Significantly negative 86.26% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02%
PL Model
Significantly positive 30.23% 100.00% 63.79% 99.57% 79.00%
Insignificant 46.20% 0.00% 16.31% 0.37% 15.59%
Significantly negative 23.57% 0.00% 19.90% 0.07% 5.40%
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5
SPG Model
Significantly positive 87.58% 99.39% 97.77% 98.72% 82.39%
Insignificant 9.57% 0.40% 1.57% 0.90% 14.87%
Significantly negative 2.85% 0.21% 0.66% 0.38% 2.75%
PG Model
Significantly positive 97.34% 98.83% 98.60% 99.19% 99.21%
Insignificant 0.74% 0.96% 0.57% 0.79% 11.46%
Significantly negative 0.02% 0.44% 0.44% 0.24% 0.00%
PL Model
Significantly positive 96.49% 99.47% 95.98% 97.72% 85.10%
Insignificant 1.81% 0.25% 2.00% 0.81% 13.21%
Significantly negative 1.69% 0.28% 2.02% 1.47% 1.69%
φ1 φ2 φ3
SPG Model
Significantly positive 69.26% 63.10% 20.94%
Insignificant 25.89% 32.98% 64.83%
Significantly negative 4.85% 3.92% 14.23%
PG Model
Significantly positive 88.34% 50.01% 10.46%
Insignificant 11.46% 49.37% 87.72%
Significantly negative 0.21% 0.62% 1.82%
PL Model
Significantly positive 1.37% 99.58% 94.57%
Insignificant 29.50% 0.38% 4.74%
Significantly negative 69.13% 0.04% 0.69%
This table shows the percentage of observations for which the indi-
cated functional coefficient is significantly positive, insignificant, or
significantly negative for each model. The data used for estimation
include 60,868 year-bank observations for 7,473 different banks from
2001 to 2010. SPG model, PG model, and PL model correspond to the
estimation of the functional coefficients in equation (5) using the semi-
parametric smooth coefficient model (SPSCM), a parametric translog
growth model, and the parametric translog model in levels, respec-
tively.
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Table 5 Summary Statistics for Returns to Scale Estimates by Bank Size
Percentiles
Bank size Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
Panel A: SPG Model
TOP100 1.127 0.276 0.799 0.959 1.086 1.237 1.577
Big 1.180 0.234 0.903 1.044 1.144 1.266 1.581
Medium 1.335 0.164 1.130 1.239 1.311 1.399 1.626
Small 1.561 0.263 1.263 1.389 1.512 1.670 2.020
All 1.425 0.247 1.135 1.274 1.375 1.532 1.860
Panel B: PG Model
TOP100 1.011 0.087 0.859 0.957 1.019 1.065 1.144
Big 1.103 0.095 0.920 1.052 1.112 1.162 1.240
Medium 1.323 0.098 1.177 1.255 1.317 1.381 1.491
Small 1.541 0.141 1.356 1.436 1.516 1.621 1.810
All 1.403 0.174 1.152 1.287 1.386 1.502 1.722
Panel C: PL Model
TOP100 1.036 0.050 0.964 1.002 1.031 1.064 1.132
Big 1.022 0.043 0.963 0.993 1.016 1.043 1.100
Medium 1.008 0.034 0.953 0.986 1.007 1.028 1.064
Small 1.009 0.035 0.953 0.986 1.009 1.032 1.067
All 1.009 0.035 0.954 0.987 1.008 1.031 1.067
This table shows summary statistic for RTS estimates. The data used for estimation
include 60,868 year-bank observations for 7,473 different banks from 2001 to 2010. SPG
model, PG model, and PL model correspond to RTS estimates computed after estimating
(5) using the semiparametric smooth coefficient model (SPSCM), a parametric translog
growth model, and the parametric translog model in levels, respectively. TOP100 corre-
sponds to RTS estimates for the 100 biggest banks. Banks size categories are: Big (assets
> $1 billion), medium ($100 million < assets < $1 billion), and small (assets < $100
million) banks.
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Table 6 Percentage of Big Banks with IRTS, DRTS, or CRTS.
Medium and Small Banks
SPG Model PG Model PL Model
Year N IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS
2002 5021 95% 0% 4% 100% 0% 0% 14% 32% 54%
2003 6181 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 29% 19% 52%
2004 6175 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 35% 15% 50%
2005 6066 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 28% 21% 51%
2006 5852 98% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 19% 30% 51%
2007 5554 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 15% 35% 50%
2008 5161 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 29% 20% 51%
2009 4718 99% 0% 1% 100% 0% 0% 48% 7% 45%
2010 4364 98% 0% 2% 100% 0% 0% 65% 3% 33%
Avg 5455 98% 0% 2% 100% 0% 0% 31% 20% 49%
Big Banks
SPG Model PG Model PL Model
Year N IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS
2002 260 68% 23% 8% 70% 6% 24% 23% 9% 68%
2003 309 83% 12% 5% 75% 5% 20% 41% 5% 54%
2004 340 85% 7% 8% 76% 5% 19% 39% 8% 54%
2005 355 70% 12% 18% 73% 6% 21% 27% 17% 55%
2006 364 59% 18% 23% 69% 7% 24% 14% 31% 55%
2007 349 65% 13% 22% 68% 6% 26% 10% 39% 51%
2008 323 80% 11% 9% 72% 7% 21% 24% 21% 54%
2009 306 79% 10% 10% 76% 5% 19% 49% 8% 43%
2010 268 72% 14% 14% 82% 3% 15% 65% 3% 32%
Avg 319 73% 13% 13% 74% 5% 21% 32% 16% 52%
Top 100 Banks
SPG Model PG Model PL Model
Year N IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS IRTS DRTS CRTS
2002 100 39% 51% 10% 25% 15% 60% 30% 1% 69%
2003 100 71% 25% 4% 26% 15% 59% 55% 1% 44%
2004 100 84% 15% 1% 22% 17% 61% 49% 3% 48%
2005 100 73% 18% 9% 12% 22% 66% 30% 9% 61%
2006 100 60% 30% 10% 11% 25% 64% 22% 21% 57%
2007 100 51% 29% 20% 14% 22% 64% 15% 29% 56%
2008 100 71% 24% 5% 18% 21% 61% 30% 17% 53%
2009 100 70% 21% 9% 29% 14% 57% 52% 6% 42%
2010 100 70% 17% 13% 52% 9% 39% 65% 2% 33%
Avg 100 65% 26% 9% 23% 18% 59% 39% 10% 51%
This table shows the percentage of observations with statistically significant increasing (IRTS), decreasing
(DRTS), and constant (CRTS) RTS. A specific RTS estimate indicates IRTS, DRTS, or CRTS if its 95%
confidence interval lies entirely above, entirely below, or includes one, respectively. The data used for estimation
include 60,868 year-bank observations for 7,473 different banks from 2001 to 2010. SPG model, PG model,
and PL model correspond to RTS estimates computed after estimating (5) using the semiparametric smooth
coefficient model (SPSCM), a parametric translog growth model, and the parametric translog model in levels,
respectively. TOP100 corresponds to RTS estimates for the 100 biggest banks. Banks size categories are: Big
(assets > $1 billion), medium ($100 million < assets < $1 billion), and small (assets < $100 million) banks.
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Table 7 Summary Statistics for Nonparametric RTS Estimates for the Ten Biggest Banks
Percentiles
Year RTS Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
2002 Lower bound 1.385 0.418 0.860 1.053 1.308 1.766 1.969
Estimate 1.393 0.423 0.864 1.055 1.310 1.785 1.977
Upper bound 1.400 0.427 0.867 1.057 1.312 1.804 1.985
2003 Lower bound 1.441 0.404 0.675 1.234 1.447 1.586 2.046
Estimate 1.459 0.423 0.676 1.237 1.448 1.592 2.098
Upper bound 1.477 0.442 0.676 1.240 1.450 1.598 2.151
2004 Lower bound 1.376 0.306 1.033 1.190 1.275 1.534 1.919
Estimate 1.397 0.332 1.036 1.197 1.277 1.536 2.004
Upper bound 1.418 0.359 1.039 1.200 1.279 1.538 2.125
2005 Lower bound 1.634 0.520 0.927 1.307 1.613 1.808 2.634
Estimate 1.657 0.525 0.928 1.321 1.631 1.802 2.661
Upper bound 1.681 0.533 0.930 1.335 1.760 1.832 2.689
2006 Lower bound 1.228 0.501 0.712 0.905 0.998 1.484 2.271
Estimate 1.242 0.514 0.714 0.910 1.011 1.497 2.301
Upper bound 1.256 0.527 0.715 0.915 1.023 1.511 2.331
2007 Lower bound 0.758 0.200 0.506 0.651 0.759 0.807 1.217
Estimate 0.774 0.195 0.524 0.652 0.766 0.808 1.220
Upper bound 0.790 0.193 0.543 0.652 0.808 0.833 1.224
2008 Lower bound 0.766 0.236 0.429 0.520 0.804 0.925 1.165
Estimate 0.781 0.228 0.458 0.550 0.804 0.955 1.165
Upper bound 0.796 0.222 0.487 0.580 0.804 0.985 1.165
2009 Lower bound 1.085 0.246 0.786 0.894 1.084 1.199 1.537
Estimate 1.093 0.254 0.786 0.901 1.088 1.206 1.568
Upper bound 1.101 0.263 0.786 0.907 1.092 1.213 1.599
2010 Lower bound 1.153 0.240 0.814 1.055 1.083 1.257 1.608
Estimate 1.157 0.242 0.817 1.058 1.087 1.258 1.619
Upper bound 1.162 0.245 0.819 1.062 1.091 1.258 1.629
Total Lower bound 1.199 0.445 0.597 0.860 1.141 1.484 1.969
Estimate 1.214 0.453 0.614 0.864 1.143 1.497 2.004
Upper bound 1.228 0.462 0.632 0.867 1.145 1.510 2.094
This table shows summary statistic for nonparametric RTS estimates for the ten
biggest banks in the sample each year obtained using the SPG Model. The data used for
estimation include 60,868 year-bank observations for 7,473 different banks from 2001
to 2010. SPG model estimates correspond to RTS estimates computed after estimat-
ing (5) using the semiparametric smooth coefficient model (SPSCM). Upper and lower
bounds correspond to the bounds of 95% confidence interval around RTS estimates.
Among the top ten biggest banks each year are State Street Bank and Trust Com-
pany, CitiBank, US Bank, Wachovia, HSBC, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Bank of
New York Mellon, Fleet national Bank, Suntrust Bank, Keybank, PNC Bank, Regions
Bank, JP Morgan Chase, and Citizens Bank.
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Table 8 TFP Components
Percentiles
Variable Mean sd 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
TFP Divisia 0.031 0.083 -0.077 -0.009 0.026 0.064 0.150
Panel A: SPG Model
TFP Growth 0.031 0.076 -0.057 -0.005 0.024 0.058 0.140
Scale 0.022 0.070 -0.053 -0.009 0.013 0.041 0.120
TC -0.001 0.018 -0.025 -0.008 0.000 0.007 0.022
Allocative 0.017 0.042 -0.040 -0.005 0.013 0.037 0.087
Exogenous -0.007 0.025 -0.036 -0.011 -0.004 0.000 0.014
Panel B: PG Model
TFP Growth 0.031 0.071 -0.058 -0.005 0.024 0.059 0.139
Scale 0.018 0.063 -0.052 -0.009 0.012 0.037 0.108
TC 0.010 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.014 0.021
Allocative 0.007 0.038 -0.049 -0.013 0.006 0.026 0.068
Exogenous -0.004 0.012 -0.020 -0.007 -0.003 -0.000 0.007
Panel C: PL Model
TFP Growth 0.011 0.084 -0.106 -0.030 0.008 0.050 0.135
Scale 0.002 0.051 -0.066 -0.017 0.003 0.022 0.065
TC -0.000 0.005 -0.009 -0.004 -0.000 0.003 0.007
Allocative 0.008 0.057 -0.081 -0.021 0.008 0.038 0.097
Exogenous 0.002 0.043 -0.046 -0.013 -0.000 0.012 0.052
Notes: Results from 60,868 bank-year observations for 7,473 different banks for
SPG, PG, and PL models.
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Table 9 TFP Components Variance Contribution
Semipartial Common Bootstrap
TFP Component correlation variance Std. Errors P-value [95% Conf. Interval]
SPG Model
Technical Change 0.218 0.048 0.006 0.000 0.036 0.059
Allocative 0.524 0.275 0.007 0.000 0.261 0.289
Scale 0.895 0.801 0.006 0.000 0.789 0.812
Exogeneous 0.326 0.106 0.010 0.000 0.087 0.126
PG Model
Technical Change 0.090 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.010
Allocative 0.527 0.278 0.008 0.000 0.262 0.294
Scale 0.864 0.746 0.008 0.000 0.731 0.761
Exogeneous 0.165 0.027 0.005 0.000 0.018 0.037
PL Model
Technical Change 0.060 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.005
Allocative 0.668 0.446 0.013 0.000 0.421 0.471
Scale 0.610 0.372 0.015 0.000 0.343 0.401
Exogeneous 0.505 0.255 0.015 0.000 0.227 0.284
Notes: Results from 60,868 bank-year observations for 7,473 different banks for
SPG, PG, and PL models.
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Fig. 1 Density plots of estimated functional coefficients.
Fig. 2 Confidence intervals for bootstrapped standard errors of SPG model.
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Fig. 3 Density plots for RTS estimates for all banks.
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Fig. 4 RTS estimates over time.
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Fig. 5 Confidence intervals for RTS estimates for each model
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Fig. 6 RTS estimates from SPG and PG models by bank size deciles based on total assets.
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Fig. 7 Density plots for RTS and TFP components.
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Fig. 8 TFP Growth and TFP Indexes over time.
Appendix A TFP Growth Decomposition
Starting with the standard definition of TFP change in (7) and adding ˙TFP to both sides of (5) we have:
˙TFP + β0(·) +
K−1∑
k=1
βk(·) ˙˜Wk +
Q∑
q=1
γq(·)Y˙q +
P∑
p=1
ϕp(·)∇tZp + u ≡ ˙˜C +
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q −
K∑
k=1
SkX˙k (A-1)
Using the definitions
˙˜
C = C˙−W˙K and C˙ =
∑K
k=1 SkW˙k+
∑K
k=1 SkX˙k,the right-hand-side of (A-1) can be expressed
as:
˙˜
C +
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q −
K∑
k=1
SkX˙k ≡
K∑
k=1
SkW˙k +
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q − W˙K (A-2)
Since
∑K
k=1 Sk = 1, W˙k =
˙˜
Wk + W˙K , ∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1, and ˙˜WK = 0,
K∑
k=1
SkW˙k +
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q − W˙K ≡
K−1∑
k=1
Sk
˙˜
Wk +
Q∑
q=1
RqY˙q (A-3)
Using this result, the relationship in (A-1) can be expressed as:
˙TFP ≡ −β0(·) +
Q∑
q=1
(Rq − γq(·))Y˙q +
K−1∑
k=1
(Sk − βk(·)) ˙˜Wk −
P∑
p=1
ϕp(·)∇tZp − u (A-4)
Appendix B Model Specifications and Estimation
Following Li et al (2002) and Li and Racine (2007), the local-constant estimator for Ψ(z) in 9 is expressed as:
Ψˆ(z) =
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
XitX ′itK
(Zit − z
h
)]−1 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
XitYitK
(Zit − z
h
)
(A-5)
where N and T denotes number of banks and time periods, respectively, h is a (K+Q+P ) vector with each element
a selected bandwidth for each z variable and K(·) is the product Gaussian kernel function.34
Note that if the kernel function is absent, then the SPSC estimator reduces to its OLS counterpart. The SPSC
model also nests the partially linear model proposed by Robinson (1988) as a special case, which makes only the
intercept an unknown smooth function of the Z variables.
Following Li and Racine (2010), we employ the most commonly used least-squares cross-validation (LSCV)
method, which is a fully automatic data-driven approach, to select the bandwidth vector h, i.e.,
CVlc(h) = min
h
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
[Yit −X ′itΨˆ−it(Zit)]2M(Zit) (A-6)
where CVlc(h) determines the cross-validation bandwidth vector h for local constant estimator, X ′itΨˆ−it(Zit) is the
leave-one-out local-constant kernel conditional mean, and 0 ≤ M(·) ≤ 1 is a weight function that serves to avoid
difficulties caused by dividing by zero. Unlike other methods proposed in the recent literature (e.g. Feng and Serletis,
2010 and Wheelock and Wilson, 2011) the SPG model can be easily estimated using widely available statistical
software. For instance, the bandwidths for the Z variables and the smooth coefficients can be estimated using the
NP package in R (Hayfield and Racine 2008).35
34 Explicitly, the kernel function is written as:
K(·) =
K+Q+P∏
l=1
1√
2pi
exp
(
−1
2
(Zlit − zl
hl
)2)
35 We use the functions npscoefbw and npscoef with their default values. To decrease the estimation computational
time, we set the optimization options to ”nmulti=1”, ”optim.abstol = 0.000001”, and ”optim.reltol = sqrt(0.000001)”.
Now, assuming that f(·) in (3) is translog, the estimating equation for the PL model is:
f(·) =α0 +
K−1∑
k=1
θk ln W˜k +
1
2
K−1∑
k=1
K−1∑
m=1
θkm ln W˜k ln W˜m +
Q∑
q=1
αq lnYq +
1
2
Q∑
q=1
Q∑
o=1
αqo lnYq lnYo
+
Q∑
q=1
K−1∑
k=1
δqk lnYq ln W˜k + αt t+
1
2
αtt t
2 +
Q∑
q=1
λqt lnYq t+
K−1∑
k=1
δkt ln W˜k t+
P∑
p=1
φpZp
+
1
2
P∑
p=1
P∑
l=1
φplZpZl +
P∑
p=1
K−1∑
k=1
ρpkZp ln W˜k +
P∑
p=1
Q∑
q=1
τpqZp lnYq +
P∑
p=1
φptZp t+ u
(A-7)
After estimating (A-7), the functional coefficients for the PL model are computed using:
∂f
∂ ln W˜k
= βk(·) =θk +
K−1∑
m=1
θkm ln W˜m +
Q∑
q=1
δqk lnYq + δktt+
P∑
p=1
ρpkZp, ∀k = 1, . . . ,K − 1 (A-8)
∂f
∂ lnYq
= γq(·) =αq +
Q∑
o=1
αqo lnYo +
K−1∑
k=1
δqk ln W˜k + λqt t+
P∑
p=1
τpqZp, ∀q = 1, . . . , Q (A-9)
∂f
∂Zp
= ϕp(·) =φp +
P∑
l=1
φplZl +
K−1∑
k=1
ρpk ln W˜k +
Q∑
q=1
τpq lnYq + φpt t, ∀p = 1, . . . , P (A-10)
∂f
∂t
= β0(·) =αt + αttt+
Q∑
q=1
λqt lnYq +
K−1∑
k=1
δkt ln W˜k +
P∑
p=1
φptZp (A-11)
Plugging (A-8)-(A-11) into (5) gives:
˙˜
C =
αt + αttt+ Q∑
q=1
λqt lnYq +
K−1∑
k=1
δkt ln W˜k +
P∑
p=1
φptZp

+
K−1∑
k=1
θk + K−1∑
m=1
θkm ln W˜m +
Q∑
q=1
δqk lnYq + δktt+
P∑
p=1
ρpkZp
 ˙˜Wk
+
Q∑
q=1
αq + Q∑
o=1
αqo lnYo +
K−1∑
k=1
δqk ln W˜k + λqt t+
P∑
p=1
τpqZp
 Y˙q
+
P∑
p=1
φp + P∑
l=1
φplZl +
K−1∑
k=1
ρpk ln W˜k +
Q∑
q=1
τpq lnYq + φpt t
∇tZp + u
(A-12)
Rearranging (A-12) gives the estimating equation for the PG model as follows:
˙˜
C =αt + αttt+
K−1∑
k=1
θk
˙˜
Wk +
K−1∑
k=1
K−1∑
m=1
θkm ln W˜m
˙˜
Wk +
Q∑
q=1
αqY˙q +
Q∑
q=1
Q∑
o=1
αqo lnYoY˙q
+
P∑
p=1
φp∇tZp +
P∑
p=1
P∑
l=1
φplZl∇tZp +
Q∑
q=1
λqt(lnYq + tY˙q) +
K−1∑
k=1
δkt(ln W˜k + t
˙˜
Wk)
+
P∑
p=1
φpt(Zp + t∇tZp) +
K−1∑
k=1
Q∑
q=1
δqk(lnYq
˙˜
Wk + ln W˜kY˙q)
+
K−1∑
k=1
P∑
p=1
ρpk(Zp
˙˜
Wk + ln W˜k∇tZp) +
Q∑
q=1
P∑
p=1
τpq(ZpY˙q + lnYq∇tZp) + u
(A-13)
After estimating (A-13), we compute the functional coefficients for the PG model using (A-8)-(A-11).
